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SUMMARY 
In the quest to expand profits, a large number of firms eventually seek access to 
international markets. This paper attempts to determine the factors that influence 
whether a firm will choose to invest in a foreign market. This is an important research 
question for several reasons. First of all, the empirical results are based on firm-level 
data whereas previous studies have relied on industry-level data. Also, China has 
recently become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment. Once the determinants 
of foreign direct investment are better understood, firms will have a clearer understanding 
of the process. The main results are as follows. The marginal impact of an increase in 
the US market share of the parent firm on the probability of entry is positive, both in the 
overall sample and in the case of the three industries we have analyzed. In the case of the 
R&D ratio, while the marginal impact on the probability of entry is negative in the case 
of the overall sample, this result appears to be mainly driven by the large negative effect 
of the R&D ratio on entry in the telephone and telegraph apparatus industry. The results 




Profit-maximizing firms constantly look to increase revenue and reduce costs. 
One of the means through which a firm can increase revenue is by enlarging their 
customer base. Similarly, producers can reduce costs by broadening their supplier base 
to include firms that can provide inputs at lower prices. These two objectives are 
accomplished through marketing, advertising, training, recruiting, partnering, etc. 
Eventually, the marginal cost of obtaining a new domestic customer increases to the point 
where a firm will seek expansion into foreign markets. Also, firms may be able to find 
inputs at lower prices from overseas suppliers. The combination of these two factors 
leads firms to seek positions in overseas markets. 
Before expanding into foreign markets, the firms must carefully weigh the 
options. Trade barriers, taxation and legal systems, cultural and linguistic differences are 
all obstacles that a globalizing firm must surmount. Before establishing in a foreign 
country, the firm must ensure that the method of expansion will allow it to compete 
against firms in the foreign country that do not face these obstacles. 
Similarly, firms often face complex trade barriers that add to their production 
costs. By locating in foreign countries and/or establishing relationships with foreign 
suppliers, firms can reduce their exposure to these costs. Once again, a firm must choose 
its method of investment wisely or else the potential input cost savings could be negated 
by the increased cost of doing business abroad. 
Although there are benefits to entering into foreign markets, these moves are not 
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without risk and cost. In their drive to reduce exposure to both, firms seek to 
internationalize through the most efficient means available. The process is complicated 
by the cultural, political, legal, economic, and social constructs of the foreign market in 
which the firm wishes to expand. 
In recent years, the costs associated with foreign investments have declined 
sharply. This is largely due to the enormous investments in global infrastructure (e.g. 
reduced transportation and telecommunication costs). As the fixed costs of going global 
fall, smaller firms are more likely to make the financial commitment necessary to operate 
in foreign markets. Still, only 25 firms are responsible for forty percent of US FDI 
outflow. 
The data from this paper focuses on U.S. firms who have chosen to invest in the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). FDI has been increasing in the PRC over the past 
decade. As of the third quarter in 2002, China surpassed the Unites States to become the 
most popular destination for FDI according to a survey conducted by A.T. Kearney, an 
economic research firm. When the Chinese government opened its markets to foreign 
investors, many realized that the economy had enormous growth potential. After being 
hamstringed by central planners, market forces were unleashed resulting in a staggering 
growth rate. This has drawn worldwide attention from firms who wish to capitalize on 
the advantages offered by a burgeoning economy. One American credit agency claims 
that annual FDI in China will reach $100 billion by 2005 (Sun, Tong et al. 2002). 
Once a firm has made the decision to enter a foreign market, it must then 
determine its mode of entry. There are many options available. Some may choose to 
export their goods. Other firms may opt to license their trademarks and other proprietary 
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information to overseas firms in return for compensation. Finally, some firms will 
choose a more direct form of investment. This option involves creating subsidiaries, 
branches, or franchises in the foreign country. The firm could also acquire foreign firms 
or enter into joint ventures. 
In this paper, I wish to concentrate on those firms that have chosen to invest 
directly in China. This form of expansion into new markets is often called FDI. 
Officially, the US Department of Commerce characterizes FDI as a ten percent or greater 
interest taken in a foreign entity by a US firm, citizen, organization, or affiliated group. 
More generally, FDI occurs when a firm invests in a facility to produce and/or market a 
good or service. This paper identifies and investigates the variables the impact a firm's 




The literature concerning foreign investment is extensive. Many studies have 
been published that attempt to explain the variables that are pertinent to the decision of 
where, when, and how to invest. This section will summarize some of the key papers that 
examine the benefits of FDI, the decision strategies, the economic environment in China 
as it pertains to FDI, and the various mode of entries and their ramifications. 
Foreign investments arise from the need for companies to pursue growth. Once a 
firm has exhausted its domestic resources, it faces the challenge of evaluating the many 
options for overseas investment. Two unique means of evaluating this decision have 
been developed. First is the risk-adjusted return on investment. However, studies have 
shown that firm behavior often conflicts with the predictions of this method. This led to 
the second idea of how firms choose to invest: the OLI framework. 
In this section, the paper explores the motivation to invest overseas, the various 
modes of entry that are available, the decision strategies, the policy environment in 
China, and the current empirical literature concerning FDI in China. 
2.1 Why Invest Overseas? 
In his dissertation, Hymer (1976) noted two reasons why organizations seek to 
operate overseas. First, multinationals seek to remove competition when facing firms 
that sell in the same market. Also, a multinational will attempt to capitalize on returns 
available in foreign markets. In addition, he found that foreign investment is not driven 
by differences in interest rates. If that were the case, we would see capital flow to certain 
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foreign markets. Instead, we observe foreign investment coming from firms that operate 
within certain industries. This suggests that there are certain industry characteristics that 
make overseas investment more attractive. 
Since this study, foreign direct investment has assumed a sizable following in the 
literature. There is much empirical evidence to support the proposition that firms who 
invest overseas do so to gain access to foreign markets and exploit factor-cost differences 
(Hanson, Mataloni et al. 2001). The potential in foreign markets is often so great that 
firms will often consider foreign markets as their primary source of future sales and profit 
gain (Buckley and Casson 1976; Mudambi and Mudambi 2002). 
FDI also benefits those countries that host multinational operations. In fact, many 
developing countries will actively campaign to attract foreign investment (Qiu and Tao 
2001). This is done in a variety of ways. Local governments will often boast that their 
local markets hold vast potential. They will give tax incentives and create special 
economic zones. Some will even go so far as to write new laws or change old ones to 
protect foreign companies from contractual risks and local competition. These actions 
are untaken so that foreign companies will introduce new technology, business practices, 
and competition into the local markets. 
These potential gains are not without risk. Companies must carefully evaluate the 
route they will take to expand internationally. According to Mudambi and Mudambi 
(2002), a firm must make several important decisions in order to be successful. First, the 
company must decide which foreign country they should enter. Second, a firm must 
decide what products to produce in the new market. For instance, a firm may choose to 
extend its current operations or expand into new lines of business. Finally, a firm must 
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select the mode of entry that best suits its particular circumstances. Throughout this 
decision-making process, it is important to select the best course of action. It is often cost 
prohibitive to alter these decisions once they have been executed (Mattoo, Olarreaga et 
al. 2002). 
2.2 Modes of Entry 
At this point it is appropriate to describe the various modes of entry into a foreign 
market through FDI. There are basically four ways in which a company can enter a 
foreign market (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992). They can do so through exporting, 
licensing, sole ventures, and joint ventures. Each mode of entry is associated with 
potential gains and downside risks. When a country chooses to export, it avoids the high-
startup costs associated with some of the other options. Also, a firm that enters a market 
through exports faces different legal circumstance than other modes of entry. Because 
these goods compete in the local market against the domestic industries, the benefits to 
the importing country are limited. The addition to the market brings variety and choice to 
the consumers. Yet, those firms who compete against imports will rally against these 
firms by demanding protectionist intervention, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
Therefore, the potential gains to the exporting firm can be limited. While exporting 
allows a firm to retain control over its operations, it is often difficult to retain control of 
foreign marketing and distribution channels. Depending on the industry, this can be a 
significant limitation. But, the risks associated with exporting are low. Therefore firms 
that are risk-adverse or have limited resources often choose to enter foreign markets 
through exporting. 
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Another mode of entry is licensing. Licensing offers the least amount of control 
over business practices. Also, there are significant risks that proprietary technology and 
business practices may face exploitation by competing firms. Unless a foreign 
government enacts legal barriers to such appropriation of intellectual property, these risks 
can be dissuasive. Because local firms conduct most of the operations, the return on 
investment is low. Yet, many firms find this mode of entry suitable when their 
technology is hard to duplicate and because resource requirements are minimal. 
The final two modes of entry are joint ventures and sole ventures. Joint ventures 
are often seen in circumstances where there is significant market potential combined with 
high risks. By entering a joint venture with a local firm, the foreign firm can mitigate 
these risks. The local firm will provide insight into local business practices, legal 
systems, and cultural differences. The foreign firm can bring innovation, advanced 
technology, and financial resources to the table. The risks, resources, control, and returns 
attained by the foreign firm depend on the equity stake that is supplied. 
Sole ventures allow a company to retain the highest level of control over its 
business practices. To retain this level of control requires significant resources. In 
addition, the investing firm assumes all of the risk associated with the venture. If the 
company is successful with this mode of entry, it should reap the greatest returns. 
The modes of entry and their associated levels of risk, return, control, and 
resource requirements are summarized in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
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2.3 Decision Strategies 
The key decision of how to select a mode of entry has been explored in the 
literature. Two main schools of thought have arisen. First, several studies suggest that 
firms evaluate foreign market potential using a transaction cost approach (Hymer 1976). 
These studies claim that the investing firm will estimate the risk-adjusted return 
associated with each mode of entry and select the option that provides the highest return. 
Others suggest that the OLI (Ownership — Location — Internalization) framework 
put forth by Dunning (1980) provides a useful way of evaluating the process by which 
firms invest overseas. They note weaknesses with the transaction cost approach. Many 
instances appear in the data that show that companies do not always follow the path that 
transaction cost analysis would imply to be optimal (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992). It 
is unlikely that these firms are unable to properly calculate transaction costs. In fact, the 
firms are more likely to have the best handle on their financial situation and the market 
picture. Therefore, there must be some other reasoning behind a firm's decision to act 
contrary to the transaction cost analysis. 
Dunning recognized that ownership and location advantages that had been 
explored by earlier studies (Rugman 1979; Hirsch 1976; Vernon 1966; and others) 
suggest possible actions that a firm will take when deciding to venture overseas. 
Ownership advantages are inherent to the firm itself. Examples include trademarks, 
copyrights, proprietary technology, entrepreneurship, and innovative spirit. All aspects 
of the firm that allow it to exceed its competition are considered ownership advantages. 
It is this set of advantages that a firm will use to propel itself into the international realm. 
When a firm considers itself endowed with enough advantages to move overseas, 
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it must carefully select the foreign market in which it will operate. The foreign market 
will have certain location advantages. These include natural resources, labor availability, 
access to markets, the market structure itself, government policies, and other aspects of a 
location that effect the ability of firms to bring good and services to the marketplace. 
While there are advantages associated with overseas markets, there are also challenges 
that foreign firms face when entering these markets. Cultural, linguistic, and other 
climate differences hamper investing firms. To be successful, a company must have 
enough ownership advantages to overcome these obstacles and compete against local 
firms (Hirsch 1976). 
Dunning (1980) introduces a third advantage by identifying the advantage of 
internalization. He observes that firms use the ownership advantage to decide whether 
they should expand internationally. And, the location advantages dictate the decision to 
export or invest directly. Yet, neither advantage explains why firms choose sole or joint 
venteurships over licensing its firm specific advantages. There must be an advantage to 
holding these advantages within the company. This is known as the internalization 
advantage: the advantage of maintaining internal control over firm specific assets. 
It is important to note how each advantage relates to the various modes of entry 
available to the parent firm. For instance, risk and return are related to the location 
advantage. Resource requirements are related to the ownership advantages. And, 
location advantages are leveraged through the use of control. The relationship of the 
ownership, location, and internalization advantages to the modes of entry are summarized 
in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
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2.4 Chinese FD1 Policies and Background 
In this paper, I wish to explore the decisions that firms face when entering the 
People's Republic of China (PRC). China has a unique history with regards to foreign 
direct investment. It was late to open itself to investment by foreign companies, and even 
then, investment took place under significant restrictions (Fan 2002). The first legislation 
paving the way for foreign investment was the "Law of the People's Republic of China 
on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment" enacted in 1979 (Sun, Tong et 
al. 2002). By 1984, there were 18 special economic zones (SEZs) where foreign 
investors could conduct operations. These investments were focused on small assembly 
and pre-export activities. The Chinese government required that investment be funded 
from within the PRC. This severely hampered the flow of capital into the country. 
In 1986, the Chinese government passed the PRC Law on Foreign Enterprises. 
This legislation granted sole ventures legal rights in China (Sun, Tong et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, the government offered special incentives to foreign companies to make 
China a more attractive location. Lengthy approval processes were shortened when the 
government delegated approval authority to local governments. These additional changes 
are known as the "Twenty-two Regulations" (Branstetter and Feenstra 1999). 
After the tragic incident in Tiananmen Square, foreign firms avoided the PRC. 
They perceived the risk to outweigh the benefits that the Chinese market held. To 
counteract these notions, the Chinese government enacted additional legislation to reduce 
taxation and offer other incentives. Aside from the hiatus surrounding the shootings at 
Tiananmen Square, FDI in China has steadily increased at impressive rates. Currently, 
China is the largest recipient of foreign investment. Though they were late to open their 
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doors, the Chinese have more than thrived in the competition for foreign dollars. This 
indicates that the location advantages that are unique to China are significant. 
Within China, there are different provinces. These regions all have unique 
characteristics. (Sun, Tong et al. 2002) note that there is an uneven distribution of 
foreign investment across these regions within China. Therefore, there must be region-
specific advantages that make some provinces more attractive to multinational firms. 
Young (1997) determines that regions in China are distinct. They have different 
economic perspectives and engage in limited trade with each other. 
Overall, China is a complex marketplace. Though there has been much emphasis 
on the liberalization of the PRC economy, companies must continue to negotiate hurdles 
to success. As China continues to integrate into the global economy, pass favorable 
legislation, and offer financial incentives to investors, firms will find the resources and 
advantages accessible through direct investment in the PRC marketplace attractive. 
2.5 Empirical Research on FDI in China 
Because of its unique market structure and its rapid growth of foreign investment, 
China has attracted much interest. Numerous empirical works have examined FDI in 
China. A majority of these papers have focused on the patterns of FDI rather than the 
determinants (Fan 2002). This section will present a selection of recent papers, their 
methodology, and key findings. 
Liu and Song (1997) describe the location advantages that make China appealing 
to firm who seek to invest overseas. One of the key factors that create this appeal is its 
abundance of labor resources. In addition, China has access to vast energy and mineral 
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endowments. Combined with a burgeoning marketplace, growing infrastructure, and 
government commitment to multinationals, China has "the largest potential market in the 
world" (p. 81). 
Recognizing these opportunities, Zhao and Zhu (1998) investigated the factors 
that contribute to foreign equity share within international joint ventures. Using data 
from the Chinese government, they confirmed that investment behavior varies among 
industries according to the level of concentration. Oligopolistic industries tend to have 
higher foreign equity shares due to the ability of the foreign firm to capture much of the 
market. In other words, there are high internalization advantages due to market 
characteristics of certain industries. 
Other research has attempted to track changes in FDI determinants over time 
(Sun, Tong et al. 2002). There is empirical evidence suggesting that factors such as wage 
rate, GDP, infrastructure, labor quality, and political risk impact a firm's decision to 
invest. Furthermore, the impact of these factors changes over time. Due to data 
limitations, this study did not separate firms according to industry. Furthermore, the 
study made no attempt to incorporate the effects of the political atmosphere or tax 
structure on foreign investment. This could be problematic. For instance, they find that 
labor wages has a positive relationship to FDI until 1991. Then, the relationship changes 
to a negative one. This may be explained by the change in climate due to the Tiananmen 
Square incident and the subsequent reestablishment of investor confidence. 
Another important consideration is the desire of the Chinese government to 
balance the benefit of FDI against the potential losses of state-owned enterprises. This 
notion has been tested by Branstetter and Feenstra (1999) using data from Chinese 
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Statistical Yearbooks and the Chinese Customs General Administration. The study found 
that the weights that the government places on consumer welfare versus the output of 
state-owned enterprises has increased over time, but there is still a significant interest in 
protecting Chinese-owned industry from competition via foreign investment. 
In an effort to determine which investment mode is most attractive to U.S. firms 
investing in China, Gleason, Lee et al. (2002) gathered a dataset of expansions into 
China. This data came from announcements in the Wall Street Journal and 
LEXIS/NEXIS by publicly traded U.S. firms. The authors attempted to determine the 
impact that these announcements had on the parent firm's stock price. Results showed 
that investors tend to prefer the joint venture mode of entry into China. Of course, there 
are several issues that cast doubt on the result of this empirical analysis. Primarily, it is 
difficult to isolate the impact that the announcement had on the stock price. Other factors 
may have contributed to the fluctuation of the firm's market value. 
Though there have been many papers published regarding China and its ability to 
attract FDI, there are still many issues that need to be addressed. Specifically, there is 
little research regarding the determinants of FDI. And, few papers make use of firm-level 
data to support their hypotheses. 
This chapter has explored past efforts to examine FDI in China. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows: Chapter 3 explains the methodology, hypotheses, and data 
used in the empirical analysis. Then, Chapter 4 examines the results from this empirical 
work. Finally, Chapter 5 draws conclusions from the study and suggests areas of 
limitation that merit further inquiry. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology, Hypotheses, and Data Description 
In this paper, I shall examine the factors that influence a firm's decision to invest 
overseas. Specifically, I want to examine a company's decision of whether or not to 
invest in China. The analysis will rely heavily on the OLI Framework mentioned above. 
This study draws data from two sources: the Directory of American Companies 
Operating in Foreign Countries (DACOFC) and the COMPUSTAT database developed 
by Standard and Poor. The DACOFC conducts an annual survey of foreign-owned 
enterprises. From this it is possible to ascertain the names and contact addresses of 
foreign-owned firms in China. This source also provides information concerning the 
parent firm and the mode of entry. Other information such as number of employees, 
local revenue, local sales, etc. is incomplete. Therefore, another source of data is 
required to evaluate the parent firms. The information in the COMPUSTAT database 
filled this void. COMPUTSTAT contains information on publicly traded firms over a 
period ranging from 10 to 50 years. By limiting our focus to those firms that are traded 
publicly, we now have information concerning the entry firms, the parent firms, the mode 
of entry, parent sales, advertising, R&D, and number of employees. 
Furthermore, from the DACOFC data we can note when a company has 
previously entered into China (perhaps in an alternate location or under a different 
charter). To compare those factors that caused entry, I also needed a sample of firms who 
chose not to enter. The non-entry group consists of all firms who share the SIC codes of 
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the parent firms in the sample. Hence, we also know the industry groups to which each 
non-entry firm, parent firm, and, in most cases, entry firm belong. 
Using this sample, we can look at the characteristics of firms who choose to 
operate in China through direct investment. As pertains to the OLI Framework, we hold 
the location advantage aspect constant by only looking at the potential for entry into this 
market. Using the information regarding the province of entry, we can later investigate 
how region-specific advantages affect firms. By focusing this study on China, we hold 
constant the market potential and risk aspects of foreign investment. This allows us to 
concentrate on the ownership and internalization advantages and how they impact the 
process. 
Ownership advantage is often measured in terms of the size of the firm (Agarwal 
and Ramaswami 1992). Firms that are large, in terms of sales and number of employees, 
tend to have more resources than their competitors. Previously, we associated a firm with 
vast resources as likely to enter a foreign market as a sole venture. This is due to the fact 
that large companies are likely to have the backing that allows them to absorb the risk 
associated with going it alone. We would expect a company with smaller sales and 
numbers of employees to have a lower probability of entry into China. 
Control allows firms to exploit their ownership advantages to a greater extent than 
allowing these advantages to operate through other firms. Therefore, a company with 
high internalization advantages will seek to enter a foreign market through sole ventures 
rather than joint ventures. Furthermore, these firms will avoid licensing their advantages 
to outside companies. This avoidance allows the firm to retain the greatest amount of 
control over their assets. There are circumstances where foreign companies with high 
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internalization advantage will enter joint ventures. If the location advantages include 
legal ramifications from copyright infringement and protection of trademarks, the risks to 
proprietary information are reduced. Firms will be more likely to enter. China does not 
have the best record of such protection (Sun, Tong et al. 2002). However, there are many 
firms who lack the resources to commit to a sole venture that will accept these control 
risks in order to gain access to the potential returns to be gain from the PRC market. 
This study draws upon the data to test the factors that determine whether a 
foreign firm will choose to invest in China. Several variables are used to evaluate these 
factors. A summary of the variables and their sources is available in Table 2 of the 
Appendix. 
This model looks at the decision to enter China by parent firms. There are three 
potential advantages to a firm entering the PRC. The ownership advantage is captured by 
the US market share of the parent firm. This indicates the dominance of the firm among 
its peers. We would expect a positive relationship between the likelihood of entry and 
market share. Second, the internalization advantage of firms is represented by the 
amount of research and development expended by the parent as a percentage of the 
parent's overall sales. Parent firms with high levels of research and development are 
more likely to place high value on their proprietary knowledge and have firm specific 
proprietary effects that they can exploit through FDI. Hence firms with high R&D ratio 
may have high FDI. However, in China, there is evidence regarding inadequate 
intellectual property protection and this may lead to a reluctance on the part of firms to 
invest in China. Therefore, the impact of the R&D ratio on the probability of entry in the 
PRC is ambiguous and remains an empirical question. Finally, potential entrants are also 
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concerned with the location advantage of operating in China such as the GDP and GDP 
growth rate in China relative to the US. 
Due to the dynamic nature of the legal system in China with respect to foreign 
investment, it is imperative that empirical studies account for this changing environment. 
This inquiry attempts to do so using a dummy variable. The variable, REG22, accounts 
for the passage of the "Twenty-two Regulations" in 1986. 
The model incorporates the industry type, firm characteristics, market 
characteristics, and prior entry information to determine if the firm is likely to enter 
China through foreign investment: 
ENTRY = f (CONC, RDSAL, EMPSAL, REG22, GDPRAT, GRTRAT) 
Oorl 
ENTRY is a binary variable. Using a PROBIT model solved with maximum 
likelihood estimation, it is possible to interpret this variable as the probability that a 




The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 3-6. Table 3 contains the 
results for the entire sample. However, in the overall sample, only a few firms choose to 
enter China. This diminishes the model's ability to account for the variables that impact 
entry. Therefore, three additional regressions (Tables 4-6) were performed to focus on 
the three industries with the highest number of entries, viz. telephone and telegraph 
apparatus, pre-packaged software, and computer integrated systems design (CISD). 
In Table 3, with respect to the ownership advantage's influence on entry, the 
results show that there is a positive relationship between market dominance and 
probability of entry. A unit increase in the US market share of the parent firm increases 
the probability of entry into PRC by 2.17 percentage points. With respect to the industry 
specific regressions, this positive relation still holds, although the magnitudes of the 
marginal effects vary a great deal. In the telephone and telegraph industry a unit increase 
in the US market share of the parent firm increases the probability of entry into PRC by 
1.61 percentage points. The corresponding figures for the prepackaged software and 
CISD industries are 0.001% and 2.32% respectively. 
A unit increase in the ratio of R&D to sales diminishes the likelihood of entry into 
the PRC by 0.64 percentage points. One likely explanation is that the negative impact of 
poor intellectual property protection in the PRC on FDI outweighs the positive impact of 
exploiting firm-specific knowledge developed through R&D by investment in the PRC. 
However, the industry specific results are varied, with the R&D ratio having a positive 
marginal impact on entry in the prepackaged software and CISD sectors (close to zero in 
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the case of the former and 0.02 percentage points in the case of the latter) and a negative 
marginal impact of 10.2 percentage points in the case of the telephone and telegraph 
industry. Hence the negative marginal impact of the R&D ratio on the probability of 
entry appears to be influenced a great deal by what is occurring in the telephone and 
telegraph industry. 
The proxies for location advantage, the ratio of GDPs in PRC and the US and the 
ratio of GDP growth rates in PRC and the US, had mixed results, and where significant, 
the marginal impact was still very small. This is contrary to what was expected. One 
explanation is that location advantages are more important in deciding which foreign 
market to enter, once the decision to invest overseas has been made. The high GDP 
growth rate in the PRC relative to the US by itself may not provide parent firms with a 
strong incentive to expand overseas. 
While the "Twenty-two Regulations" does report a non-zero value in both the 
overall and industry-specific regressions, the effect on entry is minimal. This is most 
likely due to the fact that few firms entered China before this legislation, and a small 
number of firms entered immediately afterwards. Therefore, this legislation was well 
established and had little effect on the majority of companies who chose to invest in 
recent years. 
Overall, the results show that firms do consider the ownership, location, and 
internalization advantages of China when deciding whether it is prudent to invest. Due to 
the disparate results among industries, it is likely that the decision to invest is highly 
dependent on the characteristics of the industry in which the parent firm operates. Other 
factors that could be considered (but have not been considered) could include number of 
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firms in the industry that are in the PRC, the parent's prior experience in China, and how 




This paper has accomplished several goals. By using firm-level data, it shows 
that potential entrants into the Chinese market weigh ownership, location, and 
internalization factors when making investment decisions. It also indicates that there are 
industry-specific factors that also play a determining role. With so much foreign direct 
investment activity in China at this time, it is important to examine the strategy that 
parent firms employ when deciding whether to enter the market. 
The main results are as follows. The marginal impact of an increase in the US 
market share of the parent firm on the probability of entry is positive, both in the overall 
sample and in the case of the three industries we have analyzed. In the case of the R&D 
ratio, while the marginal impact on the probability of entry is negative in the case of the 
overall sample, this result appears to be mainly driven by the large negative effect of the 
R&D ratio on entry in the telephone and telegraph apparatus industry. 
There are several limitations with this research and its methodology. First of all, 
the scope of the project is limited. The data only represents those companies who decide 
to enter China. It would be useful to examine an array of counties to determine not only 
if a company decides to invest overseas but also what location characteristics are most 
appealing. Second, much of the story behind overseas investment is not captured by 
financial data. It would be useful to survey parent firms to gather information pertinent 
to overseas entry. Finally, firms may be driven to invest when they observe their 
competitors moving into overseas markets. The data in this study did not include this 
information. 
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Future studies can expand upon this paper by looking specifically at the mode of 
entry that companies select once they decide to enter foreign markets through FDI. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Modes of Entry 




None None N/A None 
Yes 
Exporting Low Low Varies' low 
Sole 
venture 
High High High High 
Joint 
venture 
Flexible2 Flexible2 Flexible2 Flexible2 
Licensing3 Low" Low Low Low 
OLI Framework Location Internalization Ownership 
'High operational control; low marketing control 
2Depends on the amount of equity the investing firm supplies 
3Least control 
'Susceptible to loss of proprietary technology and information 
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Dummy variable indicating if entry 
occurs after "Twenty-two 
Regulations" in 1986 has occurred 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP 
Indush  classification of parent firm COMPUSTAT 
Sales (in millions of dollars) by 
parent firm 
US market share (sales of parent firm 
as percentage of all firm with the 
same SIC code) 
Number of employees (in thousands) 
of parent firm per sales by parent 
firm 
Research and development 




Table 3: Regression results 
Variable dF/dx 
(robust std. err) 
Coefficient 
(robust std. err) 
US Market Share (CONC) 0.0217*** 4.289*** 
(0.0041) (0.191) 
R & D/Sales (RDSAL) -0.0064*** -1.271*** 
(0.0008) (0.074) 
Employees/Sales (EMPSAL) -0.1556*** -30.711*** 
(0.0261) (1.220) 
Twenty-two regulations (REG22) -0.0008*** -0.167*** 
(0.0002) (0.020) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP -0.0124 -2.442 
(GDPRAT) (0.0158) (3.080) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP growth -0.000029* -0.00576* 
(GRTRAT) (0.000017) (0.00314) 
* p < 0.1 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.001 
Table 4: Regression results (Telephone & Telegraph Apparatus) 
Variable dF/dx 
(robust std. err) 
Coefficient 
(robust std. err) 
US Market Share (CONC) 0.0161* -0.534* 
(0.011) (0.321) 
R & D/Sales (RDSAL) -0.102** -3.209** 
(0.031) (1.093) 
Employees/Sales (EMPSAL) 0.629* * 19.774** 
(0.234) (6.401) 
Twenty-two regulations (REG22) 0.00271 0.0847 
(0.00889) (0.272) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP 0.0508 1.600 
(GDPRAT) (0.969) (30.462) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP growth -0.0001698 -0.005 
(GRTRAT) (0.00107) (0.034) 
* p< 0.1 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 5: Regression results (Prepackaged Software) 
Variable dF/dx 
(robust std. err) 
Coefficient 
(robust std. err) 
US Market Share (CONC) 0.0000126*** 9.122*** 
(0.0000274) (2.016) 
R & D/Sales (RDSAL) 1.90e-6* 1.379* 
(0.4.12e-6) (0.718) 
Employees/Sales (EMPSAL) -0.0003*** -248.610*** 
(0.0007) (45.0244) 
Twenty-two regulations (REG22) 5.28e-7 0.397 
(1.37e-6) (0.569) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP 0.0000714 51.880 
(GDPRAT) (0.0001909) (56.699) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP growth 2.57e-7 0.187 
(GRTRAT) (5.41e-7) (0.225) 
* p < 0.1 
** p < 0.05 
*** p < 0.001 
Table 6: Regression results (Computer Integrated Systems Design) 
Variable dF/dx 
(robust std. err) 
Coefficient 
(robust std. err) 
US Market Share (CONC) 0.0232*** 134.619*** 
(0.0246) (23.190) 
R & D/Sales (RDSAL) 0.000223** 1.295** 
(0.000252) (0.499) 
Employees/Sales (EMPSAL) -0.0421*** -243.886*** 
(0.0447) (32.694) 
Twenty-two regulations (REG22) -0.000123 -0.570 
(0.0002025) (0.386) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP -0.000716 -4.150 
(GDPRAT) (0.000582) (36.858) 
Ratio of PRC to US GDP growth 0.0000203* 0.118* 
(GRTRAT) (0.0000236) (0.0583) 
* p < 0.1 
**p< 0.05 
*** p < 0.001 
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